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Laudan, Kuhn & Hemple analysis

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Q1: Laudan believes that the aspects of consensus and dissensus do not justify science. He believes in Normative Naturalism, based on naturalistic observation (unlike Hemple). Kuhn believes that Normative Science can identify ‘good science’. How can historical accuracy be normative and why should normative philosophy be concerned with historical accuracy?

If we give the Etch-a-Sketch a good shake, we have the foundation of a new paradigm via Laudan. Kuhn would put the Etch-a-Sketch in cryogenic suspension and Hemple would study the changes. Laudan and Berthold Brecht should have got married: Laudan has essentially discovered Epic Science. In literal Laudan-logic, Epic Science can not be normative and therefore, its historical significance is scientifico non-exista. Only the here and now matters; only our perception at this minute can enunciate the past and pronounce judgement on its meaning…that’s if sentiment is required. Laudan is a literalist post-facto Whig with Marxist tendencies. Kuhn would prefer not to completely relinquish the eloquent tethers of the Old Guard so that we can reassure ourselves with, ‘Isn’t this where we came in [150 years ago]?’ That leaves Hemple, who more true to his historical intent, offers us the global dynamics of scientific perception. Chromatically, Hemple, Kuhn and Laudan polarize the Philosophy of Science; each specializing in a function: Hemple, the vehicle; Kuhn, the motor, and Laudan, the view [perhaps the windshield]. Although Kuhn might disagree, each Milestone, 2-dimensionally, represents one point on a map that if ignored, could result in redundancy. Does that mean, “What we don’t know – doesn’t hurt us?”

Q2: Kuhn believes that x scientific communities are allied in their professional judgements because of mutual commitments to the same paradigms, where Hemple perceives scientific cohesion based on the same theories, methodological rules and aims. Laudan would criticize both Hemple and Kuhn, beginning with the question itself. Would Laudan’s answer be any better?

Hemple’s underlying theme focuses on scientific progress where Kuhn is concerned mainly with the scientific process. Hemple represents the improved result where Kuhn represents the movement toward said improvement(s). Laudan can only specify evidence against both Hemple and Kuhn but not without Kuhn’s platform from which to edify his position. A sub-objective of Laudan’s hypothesis is to illustrate that scientific warriors march to the same drum. Together they will discover the truth or error of x hypothesis. If scientists are in league with a specific function, they are allied in their perception of the result. Laudan asks, ‘the result of what?’ and ‘how do you identify the result?’ Ultimately, ‘What result?’

What Hemple, Kuhn and Laudan all three fail to address is the evolution of the literary aesthetics involved in their positions. They ‘appear’ to be driven, but their product is an aesthetic devise, where aesthetics in artistic terms transposes with semantics in philosophical terms – is a philosopher an artists? Is philosophy a form of art? If so, is an artist also a philosopher, in the sense that a mechanical engineer’s artistic expression happens to be rooted in scientific theory? According to Laudan, there is no evidence to support any form of expression – the results are subjectively contained in his reticulated view. The viewfinder also falls within Laudan’s aesthetic placement. In Laudan-logic, Kuhn’s symbolic generalizations equate to an aesthetically amicable consensus that does not, and will never reach the pyramid’s eye because the data derives from indefinable origins. There is no standard; only the standard that scientists create in order to measure rocks thrown from a hypothetical launch point. When theories change, so does the world. Therefore, by Laudan’s own carefully-qualified standard, he is no more, or less valid than either Kuhn or Hemple. If I may reverse-engineer Laudan’s technique: “In 100 years – who’s gonna give a damn?”