Q1: Laudan believes that the aspects of consensus and
dissensus do not justify science. He believes in Normative Naturalism,
based on naturalistic observation (unlike Hemple). Kuhn believes that
Normative
Science can identify ‘good science’. How can historical accuracy be
normative
and why should normative philosophy be concerned with historical
accuracy?
If we give the Etch-a-Sketch a good
shake,
we have the foundation of a new paradigm via Laudan. Kuhn would put the
Etch-a-Sketch in cryogenic suspension and Hemple would study the
changes. Laudan and Berthold Brecht should have got married: Laudan has
essentially discovered Epic Science. In literal Laudan-logic, Epic
Science can not be normative and therefore, its historical significance
is scientifico non-exista. Only the here and now
matters; only our perception at this minute can enunciate the past and
pronounce
judgement on its meaning…that’s if sentiment is required. Laudan is a
literalist
post-facto Whig with Marxist tendencies. Kuhn would prefer not to
completely
relinquish the eloquent tethers of the Old Guard so that we can
reassure
ourselves with, ‘Isn’t this where we came in [150 years ago]?’ That
leaves
Hemple, who more true to his historical intent, offers us the global
dynamics
of scientific perception. Chromatically, Hemple, Kuhn and Laudan
polarize
the Philosophy of Science; each specializing in a function: Hemple, the
vehicle;
Kuhn, the motor, and Laudan, the view [perhaps the windshield].
Although
Kuhn might disagree, each Milestone,
2-dimensionally, represents one point on a map that if ignored, could
result in redundancy. Does that mean, “What we don’t know – doesn’t
hurt us?”
Q2: Kuhn believes
that x
scientific communities are allied in their professional judgements
because of mutual commitments to the same paradigms, where Hemple
perceives scientific cohesion based
on the same theories, methodological rules and aims. Laudan would
criticize
both Hemple and Kuhn, beginning with the question itself. Would
Laudan’s
answer be any better?
Hemple’s underlying theme focuses on
scientific progress where Kuhn is concerned mainly with the scientific
process. Hemple represents the improved result where Kuhn represents
the movement toward
said improvement(s). Laudan can only specify evidence against both
Hemple
and Kuhn but not without Kuhn’s platform from which to edify his
position.
A sub-objective of Laudan’s hypothesis is to illustrate that scientific
warriors march to the same drum. Together they will discover the truth
or error of x hypothesis. If scientists are in league with a specific
function, they are
allied in their perception of the result. Laudan asks, ‘the result of
what?’
and ‘how do you identify the result?’ Ultimately, ‘What result?’
What Hemple, Kuhn and Laudan all
three
fail to
address is the evolution of the literary aesthetics involved in their
positions.
They ‘appear’ to be driven, but their product is an aesthetic devise,
where
aesthetics in artistic terms transposes with semantics
in philosophical terms – is a philosopher an artists? Is philosophy a
form of art? If so, is an artist also a philosopher, in the sense that
a mechanical engineer’s artistic expression
happens to be rooted in scientific
theory? According to Laudan, there is no evidence to support any form
of
expression – the results are subjectively contained in his reticulated
view.
The viewfinder also falls within Laudan’s aesthetic placement. In
Laudan-logic, Kuhn’s symbolic generalizations equate to an aesthetically amicable consensus that does not, and will never reach
the pyramid’s eye because the data derives from indefinable origins.
There is no standard; only the standard that scientists create in order
to measure rocks thrown from a hypothetical launch point. When theories
change, so does the world. Therefore, by Laudan’s own
carefully-qualified standard, he is no more, or less valid than either
Kuhn or Hemple. If I may reverse-engineer Laudan’s technique: “In 100
years – who’s gonna give a damn?”
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