Dirty War

Dirty War graphically illustrates the political segregation that disaster response planners have from operational reality. The London bombing disaster began internally, long before any real bombs were detonated. The movie opens with a disaster preparedness drill for 60 casualties when 3,000 casualties would have provided a more realistic simulation. “It’s not realistic,” John Ives accuses. “It’s manageable,” the Minister of London defends. Both of them appear before a Parliamentary review board and explain that it is unnecessary to make Londoners feel needlessly insecure by divulging need-to-know information. John Ives cautiously endorsed the Minister’s reassurances but added, “still more needs to be done.”

At a first-responders briefing, local department chiefs furiously protested that they were not included in the planning phase of the response plan. They were neither prepared, nor trained to respond. The Minister received their criticisms but made no attempt to reconcile grievances. Scotland Yard had thoroughly dissected the terrorist attack modus: Each plan consisted of logistics, reconnaissance, attackers and a highly educated, invisible agent who would manage and coordinate attacks.

Scotland Yard was alerted when an informant reported suspicious activity to a police detective, who in turn, called for intrusive surveillance that led to a forced entry. The police barely missed intercepting the radiological bomb but did recover actionable intelligence. The bomb detonated at 8 a.m.

The media, true to form, arrived first; followed by first responders who were not prepared for a radiological attack: There were 500 CRNB suits on hand and 1,000 responders who needed them. While the Minister ordered that a decontamination unit be erected upwind, Scotland Yard began tracing leads to a 2^nd suicide-bomb vehicle.

The most potent scene in the movie occurs when the police had to retrieve the proper procedure for responding to a radiological attack – that is the moment when the reality of being truly unprepared unfolds. The contaminated area was cordoned off so that contaminated subjects could not egress the area; emergency vehicles were withdrawn – then it was determined that already contaminated vehicles should be returned to the quarantined area to assist operations. Advance planning could have avoided those delays.

In a public statement, John Ives admonished Londoners to stay home and avoid the contaminated area: When a specialist suggested delivering food and drink to the victims, he was rebuked because doing so could cause victims to ingest radiation.

Scotland Yard intercepted and terminated the 2^nd van before it could detonate.

mass exodus in downtown London began to border chaos because decontamination units were slow to arrive and response personnel were disorganized.

During questioning, the captured ‘agent’ said, “We expect your retaliation – it is what unites us, and divides you.” Islamic Fundamentalism doesn’t care about broken families – it is a culture of death that survives only to die: It is a contradiction.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

1. This disaster originated when emergency response department chiefs were not consulted during the planning phase of the response plan. That means that emergency response personnel were neither trained, nor prepared to respond to a CRNB attack. Americans learned from 9/11 that arrogance and egoism have absolutely no place in response planning: Many assumptions were made and nobody was prepared.

2. A coordinated response can not be achieved without a disaster response plan. Londoners were led to believe that they were self-sufficient, when in fact, they were not. It is also pointless to create a disaster preparedness plan and not disseminate the plan, as New Orleans learned during Hurricane Katrina.

3. The discovery of radiation temporarily paralyzed response crews and restructured the dynamics of response. Exposed subjects were stranded in the containment area. When the Ministry ordered the evacuation of inadequately protected response personnel, some of them continued to work in spite of the danger.

4. Public announcements were meaningless: Subjects learned more from BBC than from the Ministry. Since BBC is the media in England, it would make more sense to include BBC in disaster response plans so that they can relay advisory messages in concert with operational objectives.

5. There was a very clear dividing line between the Ministry and the emergency response departments. Ground crews were eager to do their jobs, but the Ministry kept interfering: Since nothing had been rehearsed; there was no plan to follow.

But…

There was one particularly outstanding quality in the British response that could never happen in America: When Scotland Yard discovered the 2^nd van – they acted instantaneously to terminate the van. If that exact same op had been conducted in America – the trials would still be going on and the agents would probably be in prison. In contrast to US legalism, Scotland Yard is empowered to engage domestic terrorism like the CIA does abroad. In America, terrorists have more rights than the victims: It’s illegal to freeze terrorist fundraising or arrest supporters of terrorism because it violates their First Amendment rights. If Scotland Yard wants you – they will get you.

England is surrounded by a 26 mile wide moat that can not be waded across like the Rio Grande. Except for the Chunnel which has maximum detection safeguards in place, ocean going cargo has security vulnerabilities comparable to American sea ports. There are plenty of Mexicans who would gladly sack the US for a peso if a terrorist wanted to move depleted uranium across either US border. Not to mention that US Border Patrol agents go to prison if they do their jobs.

An embarrassing contrast is how the terrorists meticulously planned out the attack, and the British were unprepared to respond. If that kind of attack happened in the US, our response would be equally appalling except in areas where a CRNB response is rehearsed and a committed public awareness campaign has been launched. Even then, an evacuation would be perilous, contingent on many unforeseeable factors.

The Minister for London, Nick Raynslord, undoubtedly regrets having said that “London is as prepared as it possibly can be.”