A New Kind of War

This “new type of war” began in 1998 when the followers of a Saudi exile gathered in one of the most impoverished countries on Earth and faxed a declaration to an Arabic-language newspaper in London. Several erroneous assumptions were made that day:

- that a hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and not disappear.

- that sufficient time exists to notify the appropriate chain of command.

- that all hijackings share the basic tenant that the hijackers intend to survive.

At 8:14, when American 11 failed to climb to 35,000 as instructed, the Boston ATC handling the aircraft knew that the plane was hijacked. Although the controller’s suspicion would result in different actions today, on that day, the following events demonstrate our unpreparedness:

At 8:42, United 175 transmitted, “Everyone stay in your seats.” American 11’s controller was also handling United 175. NEADS scrambled two fighters from Otis AFB by 8:46. At that exact same minute, American 11 struck the North Tower. At 8:55, a New York ATC suspected that United 175 was hijacked and notified her manager. The manager was trying to gather data on American 11 and completely disregards her message about United 175. To avoid redundancy, this summary will omit the words, “that action would never happen today” after each line.

- From the White House, Condoleezza Rice called Karl Rove and reported that a twin-engine commercial aircraft hit the World Trade Center. Rove relayed the message to Chief of Staff Andrew Card who was standing next to The President: “A small, twin-engine plane” crashed into the World Trade Center. Rice said nothing about a “small” twin. She said “commercial.”

At 9:03, United 175 crashed into the South Tower. At 9:10, American 77 turned around and flew for 36 minutes unnoticed because nobody at Indianapolis turned on the primary radar. Historically, transponders have been very reliable and still are, however, when the transponder is off, the only way to see an aircraft is by radar. All of the Centers involved did the same.

At 9:24, NEADS was misinformed that American 11 did not hit the World Trade Center.

At 9:34, Boston’s military liaison suggested that NEADS contact Washington about American 11. A Washington manager informed NEADS that American 77 was lost. That near oversight was the first military notification about American 77. Nobody at FAA HQ thought to ask for military assistance. Cleveland advised Herndon it was tracking United 93 and asked if fighters were scrambled. Herndon told Cleveland that the authority to involve the military was well above them in the chain of command. The report suggests that in a time of national crisis, heavy-handedness is counterproductive.

At 9:37, American 77 crashed into the mall side of the Pentagon. American 77 was still unidentified at the time. At 9:40, the FBI and CIA joined the Situation Room teleconference 25 minutes late. At 9:41, Cleveland reported that Delta 1989 had veered off course and might be hijacked. Fighters scrambled from Ohio and Michigan and reported that Delta 1989 was under proper control. The terrorists knew that an aircraft would be harder to find with its transponder turned off. Delta 1989’s transponder was turned on. During that same minute, Cleveland lost United 93 because its transponder was deliberately turned off.

At 9:42, 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft land nationwide without incident.

At 9:49, NORAD directed all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed. 13 minutes after Cleveland’s suggested it, Herndon deliberated whether or not someone at FAA HQ should request military assistance. An aversion to the military permeates the report on all sides.

At 10:01, Herndon reported to FAA HQ that an aircraft had seen United 93 “waving his wings.” The FAA informed the Secret Service that a possible hijacked aircraft was heading toward DC.

At 10:03, United 93 crashes in Pennsylvania 125 miles from The White House. It becomes increasingly clear that two parallel decision making bodies are attempting to manage the crisis: The NMCC and the White House. Neither one communicates with the other. The FAA was completely unaware that United 93 had crashed because the FAA had not been added to NMCC’s teleconference. NMCC learned about United 93 from The White House. NORAD still had no idea, in fact, NORAD said that there was no indication of a hijack heading to DC.

At 10:10, Langley’s fighters were given implicit instructions, “Negative clearance to shoot,” when Cheney had ordered the exact opposite from the White House bunker. The President had given Cheney authorization to shoot down any unidentified aircraft heading to DC. At 10:17, Herndon advised FAA HQ that United 93 had indeed crashed. From the onset, nobody at the FAA had asked the military for assistance. While the NMCC conference was in progress, NORAD repeatedly asked to get the FAA in on the teleconference. When the FAA finally did join in 48 minutes late, the FAA representative was not authorized to make command decisions.

At 10:31, General Arnold instructed his staff to broadcast ‘weapons free’ as ordered by Cheney.

At 10:33, The NEADS commander deliberately mis-relayed “ID type and tail” ONLY to fighters under his control because he didn’t know if the pilots “would, or should proceed with that guidance” Does it defeat the purpose having a military when commanders can’t follow orders?

At 10:38, the Secret Service scrambled Air Guard fighters from Andrews with ‘shoot down’ orders. At 10:39, Cheney informed Rumsfeld that the President had authorized ‘weapons free.’ For unstated reasons, Rumsfeld was not at the NMCC conference when the ‘shoot down’ order was issued. Rumsfeld was at the White House teleconference and neither the White House nor the NMCC was communicating with each other. Somebody, somewhere should have clued in.

CONCLUSION: NEADS had a 9-minute notice to intercept the first plane and no notice to intercept the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th aircrafts. During the Congressional hearing, just about everyon tried to claim that the military had 14 minutes (or more) to respond to American 77. The record clearly indicates to the contrary. Even worse, proper procedure in EVERY case DID call for notification of the military and those procedures went ignored. Neither NORAD nor the FAA was trained and prepared to respond to the type of attack launched against the US that day.

It is only fitting to honor the passengers aboard United 93 who in the true spirit of America, attempted to thwart disaster. Their sacrifice saved countless lives and a national monument.

Terminology used:

On 9/11, US airspace was protected by the FAA and NORAD. 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers are grouped in regions throughout the US and headquartered by the national Air Traffic Control System Command Center located in Herndon, Virginia. Herndon oversees the entire US airspace system.

NORAD is a joint command created by the US and Canada in 1958 to defend North America against Soviet aggression. NORAD is divided into three sectors with seven facilities on high alert spread throughout. Of the seven facilities, two of them were located in NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector known as NEADS. All four aircraft were hijacked within NEADS.

Aircraft above 10,000 feet ID themselves [squawk] with a transponder. The terrorists knew that by turning the transponders off, the aircraft would be much harder to locate.

The National Command Authority identifies The President, Secretary of Defense and any agency called upon to carry out their orders. The Pentagon’s National Military Command Center [NMCC] was established to coordinate the military with Executive authority during a domestic emergency.

“Weapons Free” authorizes a military pilot to use weapons at the pilot’s discretion. Standard military procedure is to squawk IFF [International Friend or Foe] or “Ident.” Aircraft that do not “Ident Friendly” or fail to transpond anything at all are subject to being shot down. “Weapons Free” is not a mandate to shoot anything – it enables the pilot to decide and Cheney knew that.