Written by Ty
E. Narada for Dr. Kyzner
INTRODUCTION
The PART I – BACKGROUND
Fusion
Centers began as Regional Intelligence Centers (RIC) acting
independently
without a uniform model. Cross-jurisdictional
crime called for a common center to analyze drug trafficking and
terrorism threats. The 1980s created High
Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area centers (HIDTA) that ATF additionally tasked as
Regional Crime
Gun Centers. The mission of a HIDTA RIC
was to analyze and identify gun and drug traffickers, gun and drug
sources and disseminate
investigative leads. [Carter] STOVEPIPING
Stovepiping
occurs when an agency doesn’t share it’s collection of data. This forces analysts at other agencies to
depend upon the originator’s interpretation and adds an unnecessary
layer of
bureaucracy. DHS was greatly handicapped
without an intelligence mechanism to identify real threats against the EARLY ANTI TERRORISM MODELS
LAPD
developed a Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) group that bridges
intelligence
fusion with criminal intelligence to support strategic and tactical
users. TEW has liaison officers with
police and fire
departments, health agencies and the private sector to provide threat
early
warnings to their fusion center. Fusion
centers accelerate the interception of terrorists who operate in multi
jurisdictions from tips received by law enforcement and the public. [Carter] [Whaley] Terrorists
attempt to ‘blend in’ so that they
can purchase materials and equipment or receive training to acquire
licenses. NYPD started Operation Nexus so
that more
information about terrorist activities could be obtained from the
private
sector. [Carter] UNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS
Extremist
groups, special terrain types and international-border states must
adjust their
priorities for drug interdiction and human trafficking.
It should not be expected for all fusion
centers to have an identical product even with an ‘all crime’ approach.
E-mail
alerts may not be feasible in regions with limited electrical power. Similarly, intelligence alerts and bulletins
intended
for role call briefings may be impractical for decentralized law
enforcement dissemination. Some
jurisdictions do not meet 28 CFR
Part 231
in the Fusion Center Guidelines and would prefer to
withhold participation rather than adapt. In
those cases, information considered outside of Part 23
guidelines can
be truncated to enable participation. [Carter] DISINFORMATION
The
media likes to sensationalize conspiracy theories that fusion centers
are
next-generation centralized surveillance systems designed to deprive
citizens
of their privacy. Expanding
nontraditional collection methods to increase public involvement could
squash pulp
fiction rumors. The Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC) has a Memorandum of Understanding between the
FBI and
several State Police departments that detail federally imposed
limitations on
open government law. There is a
misperception that fusion centers block public oversight and enable the
government to spy on citizens instead. [Verdi] EPIC’s Executive Director believes that “the
FBI is pressuring states to become more secretive and limit even
routine
oversight of the bureau’s data-sharing arrangements with local police.” [McCullagh] Public
figures who denounce fusion create needless
controversy and
aggravate public misperceptions. SEPTEMPER 11, 2001 The events of September 11, 2001 created an obvious need for information fusion that utilizes the intelligence process for information management and analysis. Creating a new fusion center can call for extensive re-engineering of an existing framework or the creation of a new entity. Success requires the complete support of public safety leaders at every level. The challenges are: 1. Develop a cooperative and committed relationship between all stakeholders. 2. Establish a process that supports efficient and lawful intelligence operations. 3. “Stay on message” as an analytic center. [Carter]
Fusion
Centers are analysis-driven support centers that seek to identify and
intercept
threats posed by terrorists and criminal enterprises before they occur.
An abundance of raw information
sources
increases the data spectrum for better analysis. According
to the Global Intelligence Working
Group’s (GIWG) national Fusion Center Guidelines, a A necessity to successful fusion setup is recruiting competent analysts who can be cleared to access a variety of government databases and make informed decisions.2 There is a popular misperception that fusion centers are designed to be information clearing houses and provide investigative support or serve as a meeting center for various agency liaisons to converge. It must be clarified from the start that fusion centers are not emergency operations centers – nobody would get anything done if personnel answered inquiries all day long…notwithstanding that some calls will still be answered. [Carter] The 4-step summary of fusion operations: 1. Access government databases, including regulatory and law enforcement. 2. Integrate database information with tips and reports from stakeholders. 3. Make independent judgments based on all available information. 4. Provide warnings to stakeholders and all affected parties.
Data-mining
technology helps to capture information that would ordinarily appear
insignificant. Those pieces, added
together, can describe a threatening sequence of events.
[Wortzel] Secure
two-way information systems such as RISSNET, LEO,
HSIN, JRIES or
ATIX3
can enable non-law enforcement entities to participate as
demonstrated by NYPD’s Operation Nexus program. The
private sector develops most of the technology that
law enforcement
uses and maintains their own security operations. Counter
terrorism experts consider industrial
espionage to be of critical importance. Sometimes,
it is the industrial information that adds the
most significant
insight to a body of information being analyzed. Since
the private sector owns 85% of the
critical infrastructure, tips from the private can greatly assist the
fusion
objective. [Carter] ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES
When
analysis determines that a threat exists against a specific type of
target,
steps can be taken to harden the target or intercept the threat. If analysis indicates that terrorists intend
to use a Vehicle-Based Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED), street
officers and
security personnel can be apprised of the vehicle types and materials
used in a
VBIED attack. Analysis factors include
financial
information, association matrices, deconfliction, case correlation and
an array
of visual and threat pattern analysis that can affect multi
jurisdictions and
criminal enterprises. [Carter] THE STAKEHOLDERS INCENTIVE TO BUY-IN EDUCATE stakeholders to understand that their participation is vital to create the best product. Without their participation, the effort to interdict terrorism and organized crime is reduced. Everyone from executives to line personnel must receive awareness training. DEVELOP a mission with goals and objectives that answer what a fusion center does; how it operates and what it produces. Stakeholders want to know what the fusion centers priorities are and how they connect to other stakeholders. [Carter] CLARIFY what the fusion center does and does not do and how those changes are realigned once the fusion center is operational. The fusion center will not be an information clearinghouse or an investigative support center. [Carter] ESTABLISH relationships to ensure that everyone understands their function. Distribute assignments for operations management, information gathering, documentation, dissemination, stakeholder relations and operational support. [Carter] PRODUCE time tables for the distribution of tactical and strategic reports and establish the protocols for disseminating bulletins, summaries and advisories. Determine who will receive these reports and how often. [Carter] OPERATE by staffing the facility; establish logistics, develop a Memoranda of Agreement, create quality control, auditing and accountability. Afford the time necessary to fuse the intelligence process into a single entity. [Carter] PART II – MOUNTAIN STATES FUSION CENTER PROSPECTUS (a proposal) OVERVIEW
This
prospectus summarizes a 10-year, $2.8 Billion initiative to create a The initiative will: - Create high-paying jobs in precision, technical and specialized fields. -
Develop an unsurpassed,
state-of-the-art research facility called “ - Build a capital base through the development of new products. - Sponsor technological development that maximizes production and attracts participants. The MSFC collaborative offers an attractive range of programs to facilitate industrialization, technical research, product commercialization, training and information management systems built to maximize stakeholder growth and increase jobs throughout the Mountain States. MSFC is administered by the newly created Mountain States Department of Development and is governed by the Mountain States Board of Regents. MSFC provides guidance and funding to academic institutions for research excellence. MSFC will: - Aggressively recruit scholarly research scientists, build facilities and buy equipment. - Promote alliances to sustain scientific exploration and commercially lucrative research. - Organize a corps of scientists and engineers who focus on technical mission priorities. The
offer is extended to all
applicants living within the PROPOSAL INTRODUCTION
The PROPOSAL SUMMARY
The
combined multi-university contribution will approximate $82 million. The Mountain States Board of Regents will
coordinate
the academic R&D curriculum with MSFC’s agenda.
MSFC will facilitate academic objectives by
providing real world training platforms to test and evaluate university
research. In exchange, the participating
universities will
assist in real world projects that facilitate the advancement of MSFC
mission
objectives. MSFC will make its training
platforms available for academic use nationwide in exchange for shared
products. DoD R&D facilities within
the Mountain States area are expected to participate in MSFC operations
and
benefit from the same. New intellectual
property will be shared with stakeholders and used to leverage
commercial
partners who have a vested interest in science and technology projects. [ GRANT FUNDS USE MSFC will: - Offer competitive packages to the most ideally suited research personnel. - Hire expert support staff, a program manager, chief research officer, a finance / contract officer, technical support specialists, marketing and commercial release specialists. -
Complete the - Continue to fund research scholarships par excellence. - Host oversight committees and tours to foster good public relations and attract talent. STAKEHOLDER OPPORTUNITIES
A
world-class staff capable of managing an infinite array of dynamic
possibilities is paramount to successful Stakeholders will have: -
Access to the -
Certified medical personnel and first
responders, on-hand as needed. [ - Scholarly and commercial assessments with technical experts to help refine ideas. - Access to the stakeholder database with academic, commercial and government sources. - The ability to cross-link with similar agencies that have similar real-world concerns.
Stakeholders
will be asked to assess MSFC projects within their areas of expertise
as part
of the refinement process. Mountain-States
based businesses will be invited to test
market MSFC
products, sit on an advisory board and obtain fast track licensing to
manufacture MSFC-tested products. Stakeholder
memberships are extended to any party
domiciled within the HOW TO PARTICIPATE Please send a Letter of Intent to the project administrator: MSFC Project Ty E. Narada POB 3121 The letter is a non-binding affirmation of commitment to participate in the MSFC project and should be created electronically in military or business block style. Please include your contact information. The letters will be submitted in a formal Statement of Intent to the assembled Governors of Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Montana and Idaho on 9 SEP 2009.
Please
e-mail statements of intent to ty.narada@dhs.gov and
snail mail a hard copy not later than 31 DEC 2008.
The Cost Share Consideration is matched by MSFC
1 to 1. In-kind contributions, barter
arrangements and alternative ideas will be considered so that financial
constraints do not inhibit participation. ENDNOTES 1 28 CFR Part 23 is the Criminal Intelligence
Systems
Operating policies defined by section 1(b) of Executive Order No.
12291, 3 CFR
part 127 (1981), because they do not result in: (a) An effect on the
economy of
$100 million or more, (b) a major increase in any costs or prices, or
(c)
adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity,
or
innovation among American enterprises. 2 Databases in addition to NCIC can include
INS, the
Bureau of Consular Affairs and the FAA. [Wortzel] 3 RISSNET is the Web-based Regional
Information Sharing
System. LEO is Law Enforcement on-line. HSIN is Homeland Security Information Network. JRIES is Joint Regional Information Exchange
System and ATIX is the Automated Trusted Information Exchange. BIBLIOGRAPHY Carter, David L., Ph.D. (May 2006)
The Intelligence Fusion Process for
State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement http://www.ise.gov/docs/privacy/IntelFusionProcess.pdf (accessed 3 August 2008) Hamilton, Glenn C., M.D., MSM
http://www.emhelpcenter.org/calamityville/pdfs/FusionCenterProspectus.pdf (accessed 3 August 2008) McCullagh, Declan (10 April 2008)
FBI Nudges State ‘Fusion Centers’ Into
the Shadows http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9916599-38.html (accessed 3 August 2008) Verdi, John, Staff Counsel, 11 April 2008
Electronic http://epic.org/press/041108.html (accessed 3 August 2008) Whaley, Sean, Review-Journal Capital Bureau
Funding OK’d For ‘ http://www.lvrj.com/news/13557322.html (accessed 3 August 2008) Wortzel, Larry M., Ph.D. Executive Memorandum #828 (23 August 2002)
Creating an Intelligent Department of
Homeland Security http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/EM828.cfm (accessed 3 August 2008) GLOSSARY Information bulletins – information on new or emerging threats, including threat indicators and methodologies. Intelligence assessments – comprehensive analysis, usually of a strategic nature, about a threat. Raw intelligence – information that is derived from a source deemed to be reliable but has not been corroborated or analyzed. Typically the threat is time critical and potentially severe, hence the dissemination of the information. Situational awareness reports – the current status of known threats or changes in the status of known threats. Summary briefs – incidents and activities, globally or locally, that may have some correlation to threats, particularly if the incidents reflect a trend. Threat assessment
– a detailed description of threats, targets, the likelihood of an
attack
against a defined target, and the potential methods of attack. [Carter] |